

Tension Over Libya: Trying to Topple Qaddafi

Key Sections of Shultz Press Talk on Libya and Other Issues

Following are key portions of Secretary of State George P. Shultz's news conference yesterday in Washington, as recorded by The New York Times:

Q. Mr. Secretary, I was wondering what kind of message, really, that the U.S. is trying to send on terrorism. Here we are attacking Libya and yet a few days later pulling out of Sudan. Isn't that a mixture of resolve and retreat?

A. We are successfully sending the message that terrorism is going to pay a cost. And that it is a very serious problem and people need to focus on it, and recognize in the case of the Libya that this is a country that is heavily involved with terrorism and people are going to have to do something about it.

Now, as far as the Sudan is concerned, the Ambassador in the Sudan had judged several days ago — he was unaware of what was going to happen in Libya — that the situation was of such a nature, that we should reduce the numbers of people, particularly dependents. We will be in the Sudan, our mission is there. We will carry on our functions, but we reduced the general level of exposure. But our message is very clear about terrorism, and I think that the actions in Tripoli helped to underscore.

More Military Force

Q. Is the Administration prepared, Mr. Secretary, if Libya is tied to the shooting in Sudan, to respond once again with military force?

A. We will judge each situation as it goes and we're not going to get put in a position where we're put on some sort of automatic pilot here. But certainly we are investigating the shooting and we will take steps.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you discuss whether on the night of the raid, did you hope that a bomb might have knocked Colonel Qaddafi out of business?

A. He was not a direct target.

Q. But his home was.

A. But we had in our minds, in the targeting, first of all to hit things that were directly fostering terrorism, such as the training facilities, and things in the Libyan infrastructure that were in one way or another supporting it.

And also, recognizing that there is a considerable dissidence in the armed forces in Libya with Qaddafi and what he's doing, tried in the targeting to send two messages: first of all, that from the standpoint of equipment that the military puts store by that the terrorist activities in Libya may cost them some of that equipment, and it literally did.

And second, that the Praetorian Guards that surround Qaddafi and intimidate people, are not invulnerable, so they were a target. So that was part of the conception of how the targets were selected. Terrorist-oriented, in the sense that I described.

A Coup in Libya?

Q. Did you think that a coup could be encouraged in the aftermath of this bombing raid?

A. If a coup takes place, that's all to the good. We know there are people, lots of people in Libya, who think that Libya would be better off if Qaddafi weren't there. And there are even more people, not in Libya, who think that that. Whether there is a movement toward a coup taking place, I don't have enough information to feel confident to talk about it.

Shooting in Tripoli

Q. What do you make of this shooting that was reported from Tripoli the last few days?

A. I hesitate to try to make, to characterize it because the information that I have is not — I'm not confident enough of it to want to talk about it.

Q. Could I follow up on my other question? Would you have shed a tear if Colonel Qaddafi had been in that

house that got destroyed, and had been knocked out? You know some people say well, if Qaddafi is gone then maybe there's a big pro-Soviet element might take over and that might be worse.

A. I think that those who would take over in the absence of Qaddafi would undoubtedly have a more Libya-oriented orientation. And certainly there are plenty of problems in Libya that they need to address. And the resources they have to do it with are a lot less, given the very big drop in the foreign exchange available to Libya.

Allied Support

Q. The British have taken it on the chin in the last couple of days for aiding us in our attack on Libya. Do you think that's going to make it more difficult to win allied support for anti-terrorism measures?

A. I think that everybody has to recognize that appeasement of terrorists and being intimidated by terrorists only feeds them. We have to get out of that psychology. So it seems to me, in Europe, what's happening, as evidenced by the attitudes of the foreign ministers meeting last Monday and then the meeting today, is one of saying we have this major, difficult, important, debilitating problem.

And we're, we're going to have to face up to it and be as effective as we possibly can and deal with it, deal with it, and we're not going to be intimidated. And we're not going to temporize with it. That's the mood, and I think that's the right mood. And I think the British are playing a very strong and effective and inadmissible role in all of this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the irritation that has been displayed this week by some people about the lack of allied response to American troops will encourage the mood which rises and falls in this city about pulling out some of the American troops?

A. I don't think so. I think that the value and importance of our alliance is clear and as we consider further actions on terrorism, and of course as we continue the process of a kind of dual-track strategy — a deterrence on the one hand and readiness to work at problems on the other with the East, a U.S. troop presence is a regard here and there as very significant. And I pointed out, they have pointed out, in our discussions, including the session I had with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the fact that the Germans in Germany, the fact that the person killed was a U.S. soldier in Berlin, is a matter of especially deep concern.

So I think that this is one of those cases where of course there were differences of view and we took an action that we felt we had to take. People's views about it vary. On the other hand, the key element here is that we have very quickly coalesced in recognizing the problem and having really on a much stronger basis than was true, let's say, a week or so ago, a sense of motion, of commitment.

Summit Plans

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Soviet cancellation of the Shevardnadze meeting with you is a tactical move and that the meeting will be put back on track before too long?

A. Well, I hope that the meeting will be put back on the track. But what I can say is, from the U.S. standpoint, we think that terrorism is a major problem and we have to do what we have to do about it and take action against it. And we feel that we do it properly with the Soviets in this instance. We told them in advance the nature of the problem.

After the bombing we told them that we had conclusive evidence. So they knew quite well what the nature of this general evolving situation was likely to look like. They heard the President's press conference on Monday night.

From our standpoint, that's one thing and the fact is there are many problems, there are many important matters that can be talked about, at, ne-



HIGH-LEVEL GATHERING: Secretary of State George P. Shultz, left, with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger yesterday at the White House. Behind them were Donald T. Regan, the White House chief of staff, left, and Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, the President's national security adviser.

gated about, discussed, with the Soviet Union. That hasn't changed. And I think it's time to get up our sleeves and get at it.

In the meetings that I had with Ambassador Dobrynin, the President had with Ambassador Dobrynin, just exactly that spirit was engendered, and I think that the President had those lines. From the standpoint of the United States, that's what we intend to do. But, of course, it takes two to do it.

Soviet and Libya

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, Mr. Gorbachev in his letter to Colonel Qaddafi, which was released last night by Tass, said that we repeatedly made serious warnings to the American Administration about the dangerous consequences of the continuation of its anti-Libyan policy, not only for the situation in the Mediterranean but the entire international situation. What kind of warnings were received from the Soviets, and what do you expect of them now in the area?

A. Well, I don't know precisely what he's referring to and I don't want to speculate about what they may or may not do, but let me point out to you that our action was not anti-Libyan. It was anti-terrorism and the kind of activity that Qaddafi is promoting, using the assets of Libya.

The President went out of his way to say we have nothing against the people of Libya, it's the terrorism that's coming from there which is our problem. Insofar as our assertion of rights to international waters are concerned, that is not only a proper thing to do but it works in the Soviet interest as well as any other maritime power, that individual countries not just be able to assert rights to international waters and have that get accepted.

Soviet Sea Rights

Q. What does it mean when they say as they have last night apparently, to envoys in Moscow that they have a right in international waters, does this mean that they contemplate to do something?

A. They absolutely do. We agree completely with that. They have a right to go in the Gulf of Sidra, just as we do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee that the Soviets might cancel the meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze as a result of the attack?

A. Well, we didn't try to predict. I

think it's a mistake to do too much of that. We have to consider what we think is the right thing to do here in relation to our own efforts to do something about terrorism and to make our point of view clear and to raise the costs to terrorists, and obviously we think about all the different consequences. But we didn't try to predict in one precise way.

I am not surprised that they took some action. On the other hand, as I said, I hope that the meeting will be re-established. However, that's for them to decide. From our standpoint, we're prepared to roll up our sleeves and get to work on the problem that are there.

The Tokyo Meeting

Q. Sir, on the subject of terrorism, what kind of atmosphere will President Reagan run into in Tokyo, and on the subject, what would you want to achieve there?

A. Well, I'll say that Prime Minister Nakasone in our meetings with him couldn't have been stronger in his view about the threat of terrorism and the importance of countering it. And judging from the outlook, and tone and content of the European foreign ministers today, which undoubtedly reflects the views of their heads of state, that is very much their view. So I would look for a constructive discussion on the subject.

The U.S. Hostages

Q. Just a connecting point here, predicting what may happen after the raid. What about the American hostages? Have you received anything that would suggest that their lives are in greater danger now, aside from what one could speculate about?

A. We haven't received anything in any direct way. We work on that problem continuously, and feel that it would be best to work on it and not to comment about it.

Actions by France

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the French refusal to allow overflights on Monday, they have been criticized by everyone. Is that still justified in view of the latest dealings that you have had, that the Administration has had with the French in the past 24 hours?

A. You see any change in their attitude since they made that decision before the strike?

A. They were part of this meeting that I referred to, which was a harmonious meeting, in the sense that

people were generally agreeing. In the meeting that I had with Chirac, whenever that was, about two weeks ago, two and a half weeks ago any way, Chirac has a very strong view of the importance of strong action and cooperative action on terrorism.

So he said to me, and Mitterrand also volunteered statements to me on this subject. The French are working at this. We're very well aware, did not a terrorist attack that could have done a lot of damage to innocents. So the French are, I think, increasingly very much alert to this problem. They chose not to let us overfly France, and we regret that, but that doesn't mean France doesn't take the problem seriously.

Future of '79 Pact

Q. Mr. Secretary, Bernard Kalb said carefully at the briefing today that the President had not arrived at a final decision on whether to continue abiding by SALT II, but he did say that Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze were going to discuss a proposed decision with the allies next week. Can you tell us what that proposed decision was?

A. No, and I don't think that the President, so far as I know, has decided how he wants to approach that. The Nitze-Rowny statement is by way of saying that in this process of final deciding what the President decides, we will, in a systematic and careful way, listen to the views of our allies.

Of course, we have been listening to their views. We've had cables in from all of them and we've had quite a lot of discussions, for example, yesterday Hans-Dietrich Genscher appeared and commented on the subject and so on. So there's a great deal. But we believe it's useful at a certain stage in the process to do it on a careful and systematic basis through Nitze and Rowny who know the subject well and have been very successful in explaining our views, eliciting their views and bringing them back a very good record. So we'll do that.

Q. Do you expect that that will support your position, that is the position of those who argue that SALT II is a bad idea, whether an attack and it will help you prevail?

A. The consultative process is something that we see as a good ally and it has been a very important part of the strong cohesion, the strength of the alliance. It has paid big dividends for everybody, both us, for Europeans and Japan. They like us. Insofar as whatever my views or other people's views are concerned, I provide them to the President and then he decides what he wants to do and I support that.

Moving Against Libya

Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to come back for a minute and share a little bit of the personal feelings that you, there must be, you must have some personal feelings this week after the attacks on Libya about your long efforts that began a couple of years ago to bring along the American public, and convince them that even if there were casualties, it was important to take this step. Can you tell us a little bit about how you feel about that evolution? I assume you wouldn't want to gloat, but there's a certain feeling that I can imagine you might have in being on a roll in a way, and finally getting over a hump of some sort in dealing with this issue. Can you comment on that?

A. Well, I think there's been an evolution in our, I think, in all of us, wish that we weren't at this point. I wish that somehow, years ago, we had been able to so discourage terrorism that we wouldn't have this problem on our hands. So if having felt that it was a growing menace I had been proved wrong, I would've liked that a lot better.

So I don't have any particularly good feeling about the fact that it was necessary to take such strong measures to deal with this. I do think that the President's decision was a right one, an important one, and it was, within the Government, discussed in a very constructive manner.

Aiming at Qaddafi?

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I try to clarify your response to Bernie

Gwertzman, whether we were aiming at Qaddafi. I'm confused. You said we weren't aiming at him. But we were aiming at the infrastructure, we wanted to cripple, we wanted to hurt the military there. I mean, if Qaddafi is the source of all the terrorism, why would you want to bombard three of his lieutenants? Why wouldn't you kill the man himself? I mean, I don't understand the logic or the explanation of whether or not we were really aiming for Qaddafi. We apparently killed at least one member of his family.

A. We had a strategy and target selection, which I explained to you. And we didn't have a strategy of saying that we wanted to go after Qaddafi personally. We have a general stance that opposes direct efforts of that kind and the spirit and intent was in accord with those undertakings.

Forecasting Results

Q. During this whole situation, there have been a number of obvious negative results that we've had. We've had problems with the allies, we lost an airplane. Now there are reports all over the world on various kinds of tensions, dealing with potential terrorism. Could you say at this point first, whether you had foreseen any of those negative factors in advance, and whether you could point to any specific accomplishments on the plus side which have taken place.

A. My wife had an operation on her back a little over a year ago. And when the doctor emerged from the operating room he said to me, I found exactly what I expected to find. I did exactly what I expected to do and it will work completely. And I thought, boy he lives in a world of clarity. And as it turned out, he was right. It was a great performance and she's getting around better and better.

In this world you don't have that kind of clarity, but I think the net, broadly considered, we did what we expected to do. I might say I think as an aside the military skill or professionalism that we exhibited was extraordinary. And once again we see some of the weaponry that the Libyans had didn't seem to perform all that well. Because the Libyans were using it or what, I don't know, but it was not that great.

So broadly we did what we intended to do and I think on the whole the results taking a balance are very positive. And certainly we have an immediate spectrum of views from our friends around the world, some very much in support and some with different views and so on. But, leading off with today's meeting as an example, I think the awareness of the problem and the need to do something about it is certainly much sharper and stronger and I don't say just because of what we did. It's really too aware that all of these threats that people are so aware of, really made it come about since our action, they were there.

To go back to your question about the Sudan, what our reductions in the Sudan and bringing the structure of our mission there down in size, that was under way beforehand and reflected the general assessment there. So I think, as a general proposition, we're well ahead of the game on the basis of this action.

Q. I have one last question: What's your wife's doctor's name?

Libya as Target

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think Libya was chosen in part through a series of circumstances, that perhaps other countries might have been more likely targets had you had the evidence against them that you had against Libya in connection with specific terrorist actions. I am thinking about Syria and Iran, who are probably responsible for more terrorism than Libya. What do you think about that and what extent is that true?

A. Well, Qaddafi is not the full extent of the problem, that's for sure. There are plenty of other problems, but he's very much a part of it. And we have seen that with increasing clarity. And the evidence we've mounted and in the case of the Berlin disco was absolutely clear and so it was time to act. And I think it was important to do it.

Now that doesn't mean there aren't other problems. There may be other things that we'll have to do. But as I said earlier, we're not going to get into a kind of automatic pilot approach to this. You have to gauge each situation by itself.

Qaddafi's Isolation

Q. Is Qaddafi by his somewhat isolation in the world already a somewhat easier target than perhaps Syria?

A. Well, of course he's been trying not to isolate himself. Syria and Iran in particular have been mutually supportive with him. I think he is really quite isolated in the reality of it even among some states who will give rhetorical support to him.

Certainly — well, when I was going around in Europe a couple of weeks ago, even some of the people I spoke to who were concerned about our action on the Gulf of Sidra started the conversation by saying — they would start by saying, "Now, I want to be clear right at the beginning about Qaddafi but I want you to know that I think A, B, C, D, E. So let's not be confused about my opinion."

So I think people's opinions have been moving along very strongly. It's kind of like what we see insofar as Central America's concerned where the general line of opinion has been shifting and now various people say, "I don't have anything good to say about Nicaragua, but..." And so the debate has shifted to a different level. And I think that's a good kind of movement.

So Qaddafi is pretty clearly labeled everywhere as a terrorist and as a person who's very undesirable.

Shultz Expresses Hope That Raid Will Spur Coup to Oust Qaddafi

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Tension Over Libya: Tough Words From Moscow

SOVIET REBUFS U.S. ON BERLIN TERROR

Moscow Says It Had No Way of Forestalling Any Libyan After Sidra Gulf Clash

By FELICITY BARRINGER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 17 — A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today dismissed as "cynical lies" American assertions that the Soviet Union could have averted a terrorist bombing in West Berlin this month.

The spokesman, Vladimir B. Lomelko, confirmed that an American diplomat in West Berlin had informed his Soviet counterparts on March 27 that Libyan diplomats were planning terrorist acts, and had asked the Soviet Government to restrain the Libyans.

"The American representative was unable to cite any factual evidence in support of his allegations," Mr. Lomelko said.

Earlier this week, the State Department spokesman, Bernard Kalb, said the terrorist bombing and the American air strike against Libya could have been avoided if the Russians had heeded the American warning.

The United States has said, apparently on the basis of intercepted communications, that on March 25, after the Gulf of Sidra clash, Libya sent messages to its missions abroad calling for terrorist acts against Americans.

On April 5 a bomb exploded at a discotheque in West Berlin killing an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and wounding 230 others. The United States has cited Libyan communications of April 4 as evidence of Libyan sponsorship of the attack.

Mr. Lomelko said the Soviet Government had no advance knowledge of plans for the bombing. "Had we had any information, you can be sure we would have shared it immediately with the American side," he said.

After the bombing, he added, the United States asked the Soviet Union to urge East Germany to expel the Libyan mission in East Berlin.

"Can one make such demands without presenting any so-called facts?" Mr. Lomelko said.

At the briefing, Mr. Lomelko also said the Foreign Ministry had summoned all foreign ambassadors in Moscow on Wednesday to present the Soviet Government's reaction to the American air strike against Libya.

As part of the statements, the Soviet Union asserted its right to defend itself in the Mediterranean Sea. There was no indication why the Russians found it necessary to make the declaration at this time.



BILL TO FIGHT TERRORISM: Senator Bob Dole, center, the majority leader, at news session announcing bill that would strengthen President Reagan's fight against terrorism. With him were, from left: Representatives Joe L. Barton, Bob Livingston and Duncan L. Hunter and Senator Jeremiah Denton.

East German Leader Condemns Attacks on Libya

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

Special to The New York Times

EAST BERLIN, April 17 — With the leader of the Soviet Union looking on, the East German Communist Party chief today denounced the United States for its "barbaric bombardment of peaceful Libyan cities." He warned that the action could lead to greater East-West tensions.

In a five-hour speech opening the 11th congress of the East German Communist Party, the East German leader, Erich Honecker, called the American attack "an act of aggression that summons up justified shock and indignation."

The 73-year-old East German stressed that the American action could lead to "an uncontrollable escalation of international tensions" that would "inevitably have negative effects on Europe, the entire world and above all, the East-West dialogue."

Attending the first party congress of an East European ally this year, and on his first journey abroad since the Geneva meeting with President Reagan in November, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, applauded along with hundreds of delegates and guests in the Palace of the Republic by

the Spree River.

Mr. Gorbachev is expected to speak to the party congress on Friday. It is an address that East Germans and Western diplomats will study closely to see if the Soviet leader approves Mr. Honecker's efforts to attain improved relations with West Germany.

Senior East and West German officials have strongly suggested that Mr. Honecker hopes to make a milestone visit to Bonn this spring or summer. A previously scheduled visit was called off by Mr. Honecker in September 1984 because of stiff Soviet opposition.

Mr. Honecker's passage on Libya clearly reflected his concern that the tensions in the Mediterranean could hamper his own efforts to broaden East Germany's economic and political ties to the West, according to Western diplomats.

Like a Warsaw Pact declaration on Wednesday that expressed solidarity with "the Libyan people," Mr. Honecker avoided mentioning the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, by name. East Germany has close relations with Libya, and East German security experts are known to train and work with Libyan intelligence officers.

The United States has charged that the bombing of a West German discotheque on April 5 was directed by Libyan diplomats in Tripoli's East Berlin mission.

In response to the American raids on Libya, the Soviet Union has canceled meetings scheduled for May 14-16 between Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and his American counterpart, George P. Shultz, that were to lay the groundwork for a second meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

Bill Would Give Reagan A Free Hand on Terror

By LINDA GREENHOUSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17 — A bill authorizing the President to respond to foreign terrorism without consulting Congress in advance was introduced by Republicans in both houses of Congress today.

Although the subject of some dispute among the sponsors, the bill would apparently permit the President to order the assassination of a foreign head of state under some circumstances. Such action is now prohibited by both Federal law and an executive order.

The bill would exempt from the constraints of the War Powers Act a decision by the President to respond to a terrorist act or threat of terrorism with deadly force. The War Powers Act, which Congress approved over President Nixon's veto in 1973, requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing American forces into "hostilities" and to report to Congress on the action within 48 hours.

Bill Faces Uncertain Future

The only requirement under the bill is a report by the President to Congress within 10 days after the antiterrorist action. The bill applies to pre-emptive strikes as well as to action in response to a completed act of terrorism.

The bill faces an uncertain future in both houses. Many members of Congress complained this week that President Reagan failed to give Congress adequate notice of the air strikes against Libya. The bombers were already in the air by the time the White House informed Congressional leaders of the mission.

At the same time, a number of members observed that the War Powers Act, designed to give Congress a voice in a prolonged conflict, did not adequately deal with an operation that was completed in hours.

House Hearings Set

The bill may serve as a focus for a renewed debate about what role, if any, Congress should play in the unconventional war against terrorism. Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is planning to hold hearings on the general subject later this year. He is a strong believer in maintaining a consulting role for Congress.

Senator Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader and one of the bill's sponsors, said a purpose of his bill was "to avoid these pointless debates about whether consultations with Congress in advance is enough or whether you need four or five hours or whatever." The Kansas Republican said at a news conference that the War Powers Act, of

which he was a co-sponsor, had not considered terrorism and that the President's authority to act in this area needed "clarification."

The bill defines terrorism as violent action by a foreign individual or group, directed against Americans, and intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population" or to influence Government policy through intimidation, coercion, kidnapping or assassination. The bill provides that those who commit acts of terrorism "may be punished with deadly force."

At the news conference, another of the sponsors, Senator Jeremiah Denton, Republican of Alabama, said that in the case of state-sponsored terrorism, the bill would authorize the assassination of a head of state who was personally involved in the terrorist actions.

'Within Intent of Bill'

Senator Denton said that if Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi "became deceased as the result of our counterstrike, that would have been within the intent of the bill."

But another of the sponsors, Representative Joe L. Barton, Republican of Texas, appeared startled by that suggestion. "That's not my understanding," he said in an interview. "We certainly don't want to put the Government on record as condoning assassination."

An aide to Senator Dole said that the bill would authorize assassination when a foreign leader was directly tied to planning or committing a specific act of terrorism aimed at Americans overseas. In those circumstances, he said, the current prohibitions against assassination would be superseded.

Swiss Won't Send U.S. A Bill

BERN, April 17 (Reuters) — A Swiss Government spokesman, retreating from an earlier statement, said today that there was no need to send the United States Government a bill for damage to the Swiss Ambassador's residence in the American raid on Tripoli. The official, Achille Casanova, said a review of the issue had shown there was no cause to ask Washington to pay.

At a news conference Wednesday, Mr. Casanova said the bill would be in line with past practice, although he said it was an open question whether the Americans would meet repair costs.

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